1. 1950-51 Mys.L.J. 111
(18.2.1947) – Achappa vs. Gopala Setty – Transfer of Property Act IV of 1918,
Section 117 – Lease of land for raising casuarinas trees, whether is
a lese for agricultural purpose – A lease of land for raising casuarinas trees
is not a lease for an agricultural purpose within the meaning of Sec.117 of the
Transfer of Property Act and such a lease can be effected only by a registered
instrument.
2. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 189 (9.2.1948) – Doraiswamy Mudalian vs. House Rent and Accommodation
Controller, Civil Station, Bangalore – Legal Practitioners’ Act III of 1884,
Section 5 – Advocate of the Resident’s Court, who has not enrolled
himself as an Advocate of the High Court of Mysore is not entitled to audience
in the latter Court even in respect of cases relating to the retroceded area.
3. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 201 (1948) – Murugeshan vs. Government – High Court Rules, Rule 59
– Whether the Advocate has to file a vakalat as required by Rule 59 of the
rules - Where an Advocate of the Mysore High Court files an appeal in that
Court on behalf of an accused convicted and sentenced by the Sessions Judge of
the Civil Station, Bangalore, it would be enough if the Advocate files a
memorandum of appearance for appearing and arguing the appeal in the High Court.
4. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 215 (18.3.1948) – Nilgiri G. Sanjeeviah vs. The Municipal Commissioner
and Returning Officer – Specific Relief Act 1 of 1877, Section 45 –
In dealing with an application under Sec.45 of the Act, the principles
applicable to a writ of mandamus should, generally speaking be followed, and
one of the principles is that a mandamus goes to set a tribunal in motion but
not to prescribe the way in which it should do a particular act and the
decision of a tribunal in matters within its jurisdiction arrived at bona fide
should not be interfered with.
5. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 221 (25.3.1948) – Rangappa vs. Thirumalappa and Eleven others – Land
Record of Rights Act X of 1927, Section 11 – Code of Civil Procedure Act,
III of 1911, Section 107(2) and Order VII Rule 11 – Suit for
recovery of land – Omission to annex to plaint a certified copy of entry
relating to the land in the record of rights, in the trial Court – it shall be
the duty of the Court to reject the plaint, but before doing so it should give
the plaintiff an opportunity to show cause why he failed to do so and if he
shows cause which the Court deems sufficient, it shall give a reasonable time
to produce such a copy.
Where any point relating to the
non-production of the required certified copy is taken in appeal, the appellate
Court has the same power under Sec.11 of the Land Record of Rights Act as the
trial Court, and before rejecting the plaint for non-compliance, it should give
the plaintiff an opportunity to show cause why he failed to do so and if
sufficient cause is shown to give
reasonable time for its production.
6. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 256 (1.3.1948) – Nanjegowda vs. Keshavamurthy – Hindu Law –
Debts – In a joint Hindu family consisting of father and sons, the sons are not
liable during the lifetime of their father to pay a debt incurred by him as a
surety, unless such debt was incurred for family necessity or benefit.
7. 1950-51
Mys.L.J. 271 (4.4.1948) – Chikkavva vs. Chikkappa – Hindu Law –
Adoption – Where, after the death of the last surviving co-parcener in a joint
Hindu family, the family property passes by inheritance to his heir and
subsequently the widow of a predeceased co-parcener makes an adoption in
pursuance of an authority to adopt given to her by her husband, the adoption
dates back to the death of the adoptive father and will have the effect of
divesting the estate vested in the heir of the last surviving co-parcener or
any persons claiming through such heir and vesting the property in the adopted
son subject to lawful alienations made in the meantime by the person who was
entitled to hold the estate until the adoption.
Further, that the law laid down in
Sankaramma vs. Krishna Rao {(1938) 43 Mys.HCR 415 : 16 Mys.L.J. 376} and
Dasappa vs. Seshagiri
Rao
A Full Bench of the High Court has
power in proper cases to correctly expound the law and overrule decisions to
the contrary of Division Benches, even though such decisions are longstanding.
8. 1952-53
Mys.L.J. 1 (24.2.1949) – Nanjamma vs. Lingappa – Code of Civil Procedure Act
III of 1911, Section 98 and Section 100 – Reference to larger Bench
– Difference in law in Mysore and Indian stated – In order to make a reference
to a larger Bench in India, the difference should arise only on a point of law
and the reference should be made jointly by the Judges and the final decision
rests on the majority of both the sets of Judges who heard it. But, in Mysore
it is sufficient if the difference is about a material question of law or fact
and it is open to the judges composing the Bench to agree to the disposal of
the case as provided in Sec.98, Code of Civil Procedure or in the alternative
any one of the Judges may refer it to a Full Bench and the decision rests on
the majority of the Judges of the Full Bench irrespective of the opinion of the
Judges who first heard it.
The material question is a question
whether of law or fact or both which requires decision to enable the Court to
decide the case before it.
Gift – Validity – Burden of proof
– Though it is a general rule that, where a fiduciary relationship exists
between the parties, the party taking the benefit should establish that he has
acted honestly and bona fide without influencing the donor, who should be shown
to have acted independently of him, both parties having adduced evidence in
this case, the question of burden of proof would not arise, and from the
evidence touching the relationship of the parties and the circumstances in
which the gift deed came into existence it should be interfered that it was
possible for the defendants to exercise under influence on the plaintiff and
the gift deed was therefore vitiated and liable to be cancelled.
Concurrent decisions –
Findings based on inferences amounting to misconceptions – Interference in
second appeal - The High Court could interfere inspite of concurrent findings
in this case as they were based on inferences amounting to misconceptions which
were not quite supportable on a proper construction of the gift deed and the
probabilities.
9. 1952-53
Mys.L.J. 99 (30.3.1950) – Mallappa vs. Paldar Gowda Dongalappa – Code of Civil
Procedure, Act III of 1911, Order XL Rule 1 – The Courts have
discretionary power to appoint a receiver under Order XL, Rule 1 of CPC
whenever it appears to be just and convenient. This discretion must be
exercised with a view to all the circumstances of the case. The terms ‘just and
convenient’ are wide enough to cover cases other than those in which
allegations of waste or deterioration are made against the defendant. While
there is no reference to these conditions in Order XL Rule d1 of the Code and
these among other are expressly mentioned as being necessary for an order of
temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1, the difference between Order XL
Rule 1 and Order XXXIX Rule1 cannot be taken to be of no significance.
Where the plaintiff sued to recover
certain lands under a legal title and the defendant had failed to make good his
right to the properties in a previous litigation against the plaintiff and
prima facie the plaintiff had a better claim to the properties than the
defendant, and the defendant was in possession only on the strength of an order
of temporary injunction which ceased to exist, the trial Court was right in
appointing a receiver. The order is not invalid merely because some of the
lands were leased by the defendant to others, as it is a circumstance which
could be taken into account by the receiver while managing the property.
10. 1954
Mys.L.J. 12 – Sampu Gowda vs. State of Mysore – Constitution of India Articles
226 and 35(1) – Writs : Issue of – Certiorari – principles governing
issue of writs – The Government has no power under the Land Revenue Code to
review its former orders in Revenue appeals – Neither S.217 nor 233(h) or (n)
of the Land Revenue Code empower the Government to set aside its own previous
orders passed in Revenue appeals – Government dealing with Revenue appeals is a
tribunal and its orders which are ultra vires are liable to be quashed by the
issue of writ of certiorari.
11. 1954
Mys.L.J. 33 – Hutcha Thimmegowda vs. Dyavamma – Hindu Law – Debts –
Mitakshara – Father’s debts – Son’s liability – Pious obligation – In view of
the decision of the Supreme Court in Pannalal vs. Msst. Naraini (1952 SCR 544),
the son is bound according to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law to discharge
his father’s debts whether the father is alive or not. The Full Bench decision
in Kala vs. Javare
Gowda
Chief Justice Venkataramaiya observed
“Having regard to the views expressed by the Supreme Court the rules governing
liability of sons for debts of the father and alienations of joint family
properties by the father may be stated as follows:
(1) The sons
have a pious duty to discharge the father’s debt whether the father is dead or
alive. (2) An alienation of family property by way of mortgage or sale by the
father is valid if it be for legal necessity or for discharge of an antecedent
debt. (3) If the debt due under a mortgage by the father is not realized by
sale of the mortgaged property, the amount left due may be recovered from the
shares of the sons in the family properties. (4) The liability of the sons is
however subject to the law of limitation and the debt not being shown to be
illegal or immoral.”
12. 1955 Mys.L.J.
105 – S. Sundara Rao vs. B. Appiah Naidu – Civil Procedure Code V of 1908,
Ss.38, 39 and 47, Limitation Act, Article 182 – Step in aid – The
filing of successive applications for transfer of the decree for the purpose of
execution is a step in aid for the purpose of limitation. Omission to file a
copy of the decree with the application for the transfer thereof does not
render the application void and ineffective as a step in aid. There is no
obligation on the part of the decree-holder to file a copy of the decree along
with the application for transfer.
A bona-fide application for transfer
of the decree though no report of non-satisfaction of the decree had not been
yet made by the Court to which it had been previously transferred is not
invalid and such an application is effective as a step in aid. Failure on the
part of the judgment-debtor to object to an application for transfer of the
decree precludes him from subsequently objecting to the execution of the decree
on the ground that the application for transfer was itself non maintainable as
non-satisfaction certificate had not been received by the transferring court.
13. 1958
Mys.L.J. 208 – Gordon Frederick Muirhead (In the matter of the Last Will and
Testament of Alexandrina Colquehoun Errington) – Succession Act, Sec.300(1) – Jurisdiction of High
Court to grant probate or letters of administration – The High Court has
jurisdiction to grant probate and or letters of administration in respect of an
estate the whole of which is within the State of Mysore.
14. ILR 1961(1)
Mys. 85 – Malleshappa Hanumappa Bellary vs. The State of Mysore India
15. ILR 1961(2)
Mys. 1111 – Gangavva vs. Udachappa – Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act IX of 1309
F, Sec.14 (corresponding to Sec.18, Indian Land Acquisition Act –
Whether the Acquisition Court can go behind the reference and examine its
validity – The Land Acquisition Court can go behind the reference made by the
collector under Sec.14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (or under Sec.18
of the Indian Land Acquisition Act) and examine whether the application on
which the reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation.
16. ILR 1962(1)
Mys. 161 – Lingamma vs. Puttegowda and Another – Limitation Act IX of 1908
Articles 142 and 144 – Suit for possession based on title – In a
suit for possession based on title, the plaintiff has to prove not only his
title to the suit property but also his possession of the same within 12 years
of the suit.
Where
it is proved that the plaintiff or his predecessor in title has not been in
possession at all, the relevant article of the Limitation Act which governs the
case is Art.142.
A plaintiff who seeks to eject persons
from immovable property claimed by him on the ground that although they entered
into such property as tenants were in wrongful possession there of but fails to
prove his allegations and has to establish his possession within 12 years of
the suit.
17. ILR 1962(1)
Mys. 225 – Sundara Adappa and others vs. Girija and others – Madras Aliya
Santhana Act IX of 1949 Sec.36(3) – A sole member of a nissanthathi
Kavaru of whom a share has been allotted in the family properties by a
preliminary decree gets as per Sec.36(3) of the Aliyasanthana Act only a life
interest in the share allotted to him. The life interest so secured does not
get itself enlarged by the explanation to Sec.30(1) of the Hindu Succession Act
and is not capable of being disposed of by a will.
18. ILR
1962(1) Mys. 397 – Shri Ramakrishna Theatre vs. The Chief Revenue Controlling
Authority – Mysore Stamp Act II of 1900, Sec.54 – Indian Stamp Act II of 1899,
Sec.57 – On the question whether the reference under Sec.54 of the
Mysore Stamp act by the Commissioner of Stamps of Mysore, to whom the
proceedings, consequent on the re-organisation of States, were transferred, was
competent under the circumstances of the case – Held, (1) that the reference
was incompetent and the Court derived no jurisdiction to decide the questions
referred to therein; (2) that the Commissioner of Stamps (Board of Revenue) has
power to make a reference to the High Court under Sec.54 of the Mysore Stamp
Act corresponding to Sec.57 of the Indian Stamp Act and that power is very wide
and the authority can exercise its power to refer even in cases “otherwise
coming to its notice”. All that is necessary to make a reference competent is
that there should be a case still pending before the Revenue authorities; (3)
that the word ‘Case’ means matter which has to be disposed of by the Revenue
Authorities conformably to the judgment of the High Court. If the Collector of
Board of Revenue has decided the question, no reference can be made to the High
Court by the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority.
19. ILR 1963(2)
Mys. 592 – Rachagouda
Gurusiddappa Patil Bombay Civil Court ’s jurisdiction to grant a
declaratory relief, despite the fact it possesses wide jurisdiction in the
matter of deciding civil disputes, is controlled by the provisions contained in
Sec.42 of the Specific Relief Act. (5) That all claims for possession of
agricultural land do not come within the purposes of the Act. (6) That the
Mamlatdar is constituted as a special Tribunal to decide certain matter arising
under the “Act” with a view to implement the provisions of the “Act”. He is not
constituted as one more Court in the hierarchy of Courts, with exclusive
jurisdiction to try all cases in which directly or incidentally disputes
enumerated in Sec.70 arise for determination whether the same has anything to
do with the ‘purposes of the act’ or not. (7) That no appeal is provided
against any decision under Sec.70 as such. A dispute of the type with which we
are concerned in this case, raises serious questions of fact for decision and
if such a dispute was intended to be tried by the Mamlatdar, the Legislature
would have certainly provided for an appeal against his order.
20. ILR 1963(1)
Mys. 679 – T.N. Nanjunda Setty vs. The State of Mysore – Mysore Stamp Act II of
1900 – Section 2(15) and Article 42 – On the question whether the
‘release’ deeds executed by the members of the joint Hindu family in full quits
of their share of the family properties, agreeing to receive cash consideration
paid out from the common property should bear the stamp duty payable on deeds
of partition – Held – (1) That the documents in question were instruments of
partition as the executants intended to get cash assets which formed part of
the common property, and required to be stamped as such. (2) That if the result
of the transaction is a division in severalty of what the parties considered to
be common property, the transaction is a partition. (3) That the true principle
is whether the transaction results in allotting exclusive shares from the
common property. (4) That a partition involves an element of release also,
since each of the shares relinquishes in favour of the other his interest in
the property allotted to other. At the same time he obtains full interest in
the property allotted to him. A release may be for consideration or without
consideration. (5) That the real test is the intended result. Whether the
particular result is achieved or not does not come within the scope of the
Stamp Act. If the result intended to be achieved by the execution of a release
deed is to divide common property into exclusive shares, there is no reason why
it should not be regarded as n instrument of partition. In other words, the
substance of the transaction has to be looked into. (6) That while every
release may not represent a partition of the common property every partition
necessarily involves a double or multiple release and a partition is a specific
kind of release. (7) That partition is not confined to items of immovable
property. The property owned in common may be of any character and in effecting
partition, allocation may be made to a sharer either of one category of
property or of another or of more categories of property than one. If the cash
allotted comes from the common property, it does not cease to be a partition.
21. ILR 1964(1)
Mys. 545 – Dasappa vs. Jogiah – Mysore
22. ILR 1964(2)
Mys. 643 – Ramacharya Narayanacharya Burli vs. State of Mysore – Land
Acquisition Act – Sections 23 and 24 – Compensation – Apportionment
between landlord and Permanent tenant – On the question whether the decisions
of this Court in R.A. No.34 of 1955 and R.A. No.161 of 1955 lay down the law
correctly – Held – (1) That the decisions of this Court in R.A.34/1955 and
R.A.161/1955 which lay down as a general proposition that the ratio of
apportionment between landlord and Permanent tenant should be fifty-fifty do
not lay down the correct law. (2) That the right of reversion cannot be taken
into consideration as a hypothetical consideration in all cases but should be
taken into account where the terms of the lease disclose reasonable possibility
of the landlord getting back the land. (3) That the right to enhance the rent
is not an invariable incident of the Proprietory right of a landlord but depends
upon the terms and conditions of the tenancy which ought to be proved in every
case in which the landlord claims enhanced compensation on the basis of his
right to enhance the rent. (4) That a landlord claiming enhanced compensation
on the ground of existence of minerals must put forward that ground before the
land acquisition offices and prove the existence of minerals. It cannot be
assumed. (5) That the claim for subsoil right as well as their value, real or
potential is a matter of proof and any party claiming enhanced value for such a
right in the total amount of compensation must set up and prove the same.
23. ILR 1966(1)
Mys. 464 – Easa
Munawar India Mysore Court Act
24. ILR 1967(1)
Mys. 563 – M.S.R.T.C. vs. The Mysore
25. ILR 1968(1)
Mys. 368 – M.A. Sharada Bai vs. The State of Mysore – Mysore Rent Control Act –
Section 4(2) and 8(4) – Scope of
Sec.4(2) – Rule (ii) - Whether repugnant to Sec.4(2) – Sec.4(2)
prohibits a landlord from letting, occupying or permitting to be occupied a
building referred to in sub-section (1) without giving intimation of vacancy to
the Controller. The said restriction imposed by the statute is absolute. Where
the landlord gives intimation of vacancy the restriction on his rights is
limited to the period specified in sub-section (2) of Sec.4 during which he is
under a statutory obligation to keep the building vacant. That restriction
however is relaxed or removed where the Controller grants permission to let,
occupy or permit to be occupied; but such permission is limited to and
operative only for the period specified in Sec.4(2) and cannot extend beyond
that period. The rights of the landlord after the termination of the
proceedings under Sec.8 are controlled not by Sec.4(2) but by other provisions
of Part II of the Act.
That the stage at which the Controller
is required to consider the cause shown by the landlord is when he determines
whether he is satisfied or not about the necessity or expediency of making an
order under sub-section (4) of Sec.8. If the building is bona fide required by
the landlord for occupation by himself, he may satisfy the Controller that it
is not necessary or expedient to make an order directing the building to be
leased. Where the Controller, on being satisfied with the cause shown, makes an
order to the effect that it is not necessary or expedient to direct the building
to be leased to a tenant to be selected by him, the landlord is free to occupy
the building.
That Rule (3(ii) is not repugnant to
Sec.4(2) of the Act and therefore valid.
26. 1972(2)
Mys.L.J. 93 – Bhimarao
Gururao Deshpande Pralhad Subbarao Mutalik Bombay Kulkarni
Watans
All paragana and kulkarni watan lands,
other than those covered by the proviso to sub-section (3) of Sec.3 of the Act
are governed by the Act, and all those lands stand resumed and they have to be
re-granted in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Re-grant means grant
to the person from whom lands have been resumed.
In enacting Sec.4, the Legislature did
not intend to deal with watan office but was only dealing with the lands that
were held under watan tenure. The expression ‘holder of the watan’ means a
person who is lawfully in possession, whether such possession is actual or not.
A person who has no sort of subsisting
interest in a watan land cannot be considered as holder of a watan land and
such a person is not entitled to the re-grant of the watan land under Sec.4.
A person who is in lawful possession
of watan land as an alience from the watandar or as successor in interest of
such alienee, though the alienation in his favour or in favour of his
predecessor in interest as the case may be was prior to and not made in
accordance with Sec.5 of the Watan Act, 1874 is entitled to re-grant of such
land under Sec.4.
27. ILR 1973(1)
Kar. 689 – B.V. Mokashi vs. The Mysore State Road Transport
Corporation – Constitution of India, Article 12 – Whether the MSRTC
is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – It
is indisputable that the MSRTC established by the State of Mysore under Sec.3
of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 does not have conferred on it any
power to issue any directions the disobedience of which is punishable as an
offence and therefore not a State within the definition of Art.12 of the
Constitution. That it should be settled in favour of the view that the MSRTC is
not a State within the definition of the Art.12 of the Constitution.
Sec.19(2)(c) – It is
impossible to say that Sec.19(2)(c) confers any part of the eminent domain of
the State on the Corporation. The only reasonable view to take is that it is an
enabling provision and nothing more.
Sections 42 and 43 – The
very necessity for a deeming provision that previous permission of the District
Magistrate indicates that in reality they are not public servants.
Constitution of India, Article 12 –
Whether MSRTC is a Local Authority within the meaning of Art.12 and therefore a
State – All authorities entrusted with the Local Self-Government are
undoubtedly authorities because they are empowered to issue orders and
directions, disobedience of which is punishable as an offence; but all bodies
need not necessarily have such powers so as to make it correct to call them an
authority within the meaning of Art.12. Therefore in the context of Art.12 the
expression ‘Local Authority’ must be limited to authorities entrusted with a
Local Self-Government and understand the expression ‘other authorities’ as
authorities other than local authorities, i.e., to say authorities which may be
regarded as a State nor because they are entrusted with any powers of local
self-government but because they are entrusted with the power of issuing
directions, disobedience of which is punishable as an offence whether or not
their activities are limited to a locality within the state or the entire
territory of a state or even beyond the boundaries of a State. Therefore the
MSRTC is not a local authority.
28. ILR 1974(1)
Kar. 340 – A.J.
Aramha
29. ILR 1974(1)
Kar. 494 – Ramachandra Bhat vs. Srideviamma – Hindu Succession Act – Sec. 8 –
Succession – Under the Hindu Law, if the next heir of the last male holder, is
a male he takes the estate of the last male holder immediately and on his
death, devolution is traced from him. That means he is treated as a fresh stock
of descent. If the next heir of the last male holder is a female, she cannot
except in Bombay
become a fresh stock of descent. After he death the estate does not pass to her
heirs but to the heirs of the last male holder. If the heir is also a female,
it reverts again to the heir of the last male holder.
The provisions of Sec.8 of the Act
apply to a case in which a last male holder governed by the Mitakshara law,
died prior to the coming into force of that Act, leaving behind him his mother
who succeeded him as a limited owner and who died after the coming into force
of the Hindu Succession Act, for the purpose of determining the next
reversioner to the Estate of the last male holder.
30. ILR 1975(2)
Kar. 1015 – State of Karnataka vs. H. Krishnappa – Karnataka High Court Act,
1961 – Sec.4 – Appeals from decisions of a single Judge of the High
Court – Constitutionality of – State Legislature competent to enact it and the
same is not unconstitutional.
Sec.4 of the Act creates an appellate
jurisdiction and provides for appeals from the decisions of single judges in
exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
An appeal lies to a Division Bench of
the High Court from an order of a single Judge of the High Court in exercise of
the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.
31. ILR 1977
(2) Kar. 1217 – Gokula Education Foundation vs. State of Karnataka –
Constitution of India – Article 366 (26A) (f) – Definition of “State
Law” – The executive orders made by the State Government do not fall within the
definition of “State Law”. A single Judge of the High Court is competent to
issue rule nisi in a writ petition challenging the constitutional validity of
the orders made under Art.162 of the Constitution – Article 228A has no
application – Not necessary to post before Bench of five judges.
32. ILR 1978(1)
Kar. 377 – Balesha Rama Khot vs. The Land Tribunal, Chikodi – Karnataka Land
Reforms Act, 1961 -Section 44 – The expression “all lands held” used
in Sec.44(1) means the lands in lawful possession of a tenant, whether such
possession is actual or not. Therefore, even if the land was not in actual
possession of the tenant immediately prior even if the land was not in actual
possession of the tenant immediately prior to first March, 1974 , if it was a tenanted land,
it vests in the State Government. That the land cannot be registered in favour
of the tenant who was not in actual possession immediately prior to first
March, 1974 is not relevant for the purpose of deciding the question as to
whether the land stands vested in the State Government under Sec.44 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
Sec. 45 – The primary requirement for
registration of occupancy rights is that the person claiming such right must
have been cultivating the land personally immediately prior to March, 1974. If
he was then out of possession by wrongful or illegal act of others, he cannot
be registered as occupant. The tenant who was lawfully entitled to cultivate
the land personally immediately prior to first March, 1974 but was wrongfully or illegally
prevented from doing so, has to take recourse to the remedies provided under
Secs.41, 121 and 129 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.
33. ILR 1978(1)
Kar. 459 – B.Ignatius Anthoney Jayaraj vs. Immy Margaret Florence – Divorce
Act, 1869 – Sections 18 and 19 – Ambit and scope of – Nullity of
marriage on ground that consent was obtained by force or fraud – Petition
before District Court – Not maintainable – Jurisdiction to entertain such
petition exclusively vests in the High Court.
34. ILR 1978(2)
Kar. 1229 – State of Karnataka vs. C.P. Chandrasekhar – Karnataka Agricultural
Income-Tax Act, 1957 – Sec.10(1)(a) – Where a person holds an
agricultural land as a trustee and receives the agricultural income partly for
his own benefit and partly for the benefit of others, assessment can be made in
accordance with Sec.10(1)(a) of the Act and not under Sec.10(20(a) or under
Sec.3(3) of the said Act.
35. ILR 1978(2)
Kar. 1573 – Haricharandas vs. V.K.
Satyanarayan
36. ILR 1978(2)
Kar. 1584 – Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar vs. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar –
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 – Sec.50(2) – Expression “District
Judge” – Meaning of – “District Judge” subordinate to High Court – Order under
revision against under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure – Maintainable.
37. ILR 1978(2)
Kar. 1603 – S. Sanjiva Shetty vs. Anantha – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Sec.9(2)
– The material date for ascertaining the liability of the insurer is the date
of the accrual of the cause of action for a claim arising out of an accident,
which in general would be the date of the accident and so in respect of a claim
arising out of an accident on or after 2nd March 1970, the extent of
the pecuniary limit of the insurer is to be determined on the basis of the
provisions of Sec.95 as at that date and in the instant case the higher limit
provided by Sec.95 as amended with effect from 2nd March 1970 is
attracted.
38. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 19 – City Co-operative Bank Ltd., vs. Smt. Kamalabai – States
Re-Organisation Act, 1956 – Section 62(3) – Expression “Order” – The
Expression “order” occurring in the main clause (3) of Sec.62 of the Act
includes and must be construed as including a “decree” of the concerned Court.
39. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 463 – NGEF Ltd., vs. Deputy Regional Director, EST Corporation –
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Section 2(22) – “Wages” – The
amount paid by way of incentive under the scheme referred to in the settlement
entered into between the Management and its workmen falls within the definition
of “Wages” as defined under Sec.2(22) of the Employees’ State Insurance Act.
40. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 715 – Regional Director, ESI Corporation vs. M/s. Fibre Bangalore (P)
Ltd., - Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Sections 45 A(1), 45B, 75 and 77
- Employer not submitting
return to Corporation as required – Corporation determining amount of
contribution under Sec.45(1) – Enforcing recovery under Sec.45-B – Employer
disputing amount – If the employer disputes the claim it is for him to move the
Insurance Court for relief. In other cases other than cases where determination
of the amount of contributions under section 45A is made-the Corporation, if
its claim is disputed by the Employer, should seek an adjudication of the
dispute before the Insurance Court
before enforcing recovery.
41. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 728 – Revanappa S. Motti vs. R.T.A. Bidar – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 –
Section 47 – If a person makes, suo motu application to the R.T.A.
for grant of a permit for a stage carriage over a new route in respect of which
there is no prior determination under Sec.47(3) of the Act, and thereafter the
R.T.A. makes a determination under Sec.47(3), it will not be legally
impermissible for the R.T.A. to consider and decide at its next sitting-whether
a permit should be granted to that person without inviting applications.
42. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 1001 – Regional Director, ESIC of India vs. The Manager, ACC Ltd. –
Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Section 2(9) – Workers
employed in hospital attached to, and maintained by Company owning factory –
The workers employed in the hospital attached and maintained by the company
exclusively for the benefit of its employees and their families are employees
employed in connection with the work of the factory though the maintenance of
the hospital is not for compliance with any statutory provision and are
“employees” within the meaning of Sec.2(9) of the Act.
43. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 1015 – Patil B.V. vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in Karnataka –
Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 – Section 6 – Levy of purchase tax – A
dealer who purchases taxable goods from agriculturists-producers and who
thereafter dispatches them to a place outside the State of Karnataka except as
a direct result of a sale or purchase in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce, is liable to pay purchase taxes under Sec.6 of the Act.
44. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 1024 – K. Ramaiah vs. Basappa – Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act,
1973 and K.L.R. (Second Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1974 –
Sections 91 and 2 and 3 of respective Acts – If an issue regarding
tenancy framed in a suit has been referred to an officer or Munsiff-Tribunal
prior to the coming into force of Act 1 of 1974, and the decision has also been
affirmed by the appellate authority, namely, District Judge prior to coming
into force of Act 1 of 1974, and if that decision has become final, then, it
will not be necessary again to refer the same issue to the Tribunal consequent
on the amendment to Sec.133 of the act and by virtue of Sec.91 of Act 1 of
1974.
The jurisdiction of the Civil Judge in
the case in question to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of
the District Judge given under Sec.d118 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act as it
then existed on the question of tenancy pleaded by the defendant has not been
affected by Act 31 of 1974.
45. ILR 1979(1)
Kar. 1036 – Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi vs. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. –
Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 – Section 3(n) – “Premises” – What
is? – The relevant point of time at which requirements of Sec.3(n) must be
shown to exist is the point of time at which either the protection granted by
the statute is sought to be asserted or a right conferred by the statute is
sought to be enforced. Accordingly, a property which was an agricultural land
at the time of letting and which ceased to be agricultural land on the date of
the petition for eviction is “premises” within the meaning of Sec.3(n) of the
Act attracting the provisions of Sec.21 of the Act.
46. ILR 1979(2)
Kar. 1401 – Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi vs. West Patent Press Co. Ltd., -
Constitution of India – Article 141 – Precedents – Conflict between
two decisions of Supreme Court – Decision of larger Bench to be followed – If
two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled
and one of them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a small Bench, the
decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time,
should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. However, if both such
Benches of the Supreme Court consist of equal number of Judges, the later of
the two decisions should be followed by High Courts and other Courts.
47. ILR
1979(2) Kar. 1673 – H.Y. Jadhav vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Sales Tax
Act 1957 – Revision – Section 23 – Karnataka Sales Tax Rules 1957 – Rule 38
– A contract under which an assessee agrees to supply Jelly (Ballast) to the
purchaser with condition that the Jelly (Ballast) would be stacked in a
particular manner before delivering would not amount to a contract for work or
a composite contract for sale of goods and for work, but only amounts to a
contract of sale.
48. ILR
1979(2) Kar. 1847 – The Regional Director ESI Corporation vs. M/s. Suvarna Saw
Mills, Mangalore – Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 – Sections 2(9), 38, 39
– Casual labourer employed – Employer whether liable for contribution – The
definition of the word “Employee” contained in Sec.2(9) of the Act does not
make any difference between a casual or temporary or permanent employee. Having
regard to the definition of the word “Employee” contained in Sec.2(9) of the
Act and the provisions of section 38 and 39 of the Act, casual employee are
also governed by the provisions of the Act.
49. ILR 1979(2)
Kar. 1873 – A.B. Venkatachalaiyengar vs. State of Mysore – Mysore (Personal and
Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 – Sections 3 and 9 – The
Act does not expressly or impliedly cast a duty on the Government to recover
rent from the tenants entitled to continue under Sec.9A of the Act and pass on
the same to the occupants registered as occupants under Sec.9 of the same. The
right to recover rents from their tents after the date of vesting and before
they are registered as occupants is not one of the rights preserved by the Act
in favour of the Inamdars.
50. ILR 1979(2)
Kar. 1880 – Dattaram N. Anvekar vs. Shankar L. Parulekar – Karnataka Rent
Control Act, 1961 – Section 2(3) and (5) – Application of Act – If
any area has been newly added to any village, municipal area or notified area
specified in Schedule-II to the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, by means of
an appropriate notification issued under the provisions of the Act governing
municipalities or village panchayats and local Boards, a separate notification
under sub-section (5) of Sec.2 of the Act is necessary to make the provisions
of parts-IV & V of that Act applicable to the newly added area.
51. ILR 1980(1) Kar. 147 –
Papinayakanahalli Venkanna vs. Janadri Venkanna Setty – Karnataka Rent Control
Act, 1961 – Section 21(1) – Before maintaining a petition for
eviction under Sec. 21(1) of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, it is not
necessary for the landlord to determine the contractual tenancy by issuing to
the tenant a notice under Sec.106 of the Transfer of Property Act.
52. ILR 1981(1) Kar. 161 – Smt.
Lingamma vs. The State of Karnataka – Karnataka Appellate Tribunal Act, 1976
– The Karnataka Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Karnataka Appellate
Tribunal, Act, 1976 has no power to make interim orders like an order
appointing a Receiver or granting an interim order of injunction in respect of
properties in dispute during the pendency of an appeal filed under the
Karnataka Land Revenue Act.
53. ILR 1982(1) Kar. 189 – Mrs.
Noreen Judith Sandhurstnee Wood vs. Rayment Bernard Sanhurst – Indian Divorce
Act, 1869 – Section 10 – Adultery – Adultery has to be proved mainly
by circumstantial evidence and the court has to be satisfied that there is no
collusion between the parties and the persons concerned had an opportunity to
have guilty intercourse. At the same time, it is necessary to remember that the
satisfaction established by the person must be such as would need the guarded
discretion of a reasonable and just man to come to the conclusion of adultery.
Any conduct of the husband which causes disgrace to the wife or subjects her to
a course of annoyance and indignity amounts to legal cruelty.
54. ILR 1982(1)
Kar. 197 – Divorce Act, 1869 – Section 10 – “Sodomy” – Meaning of –
The term “sodomy” is non coital carnal copulation with a member of the same or
opposite sex, i.e., per anus or per os. Thus a man may indulge in sodomy even
with his own wife. A husband can be guilty of sodomy on his wife if she is not
a consenting party and that will afford the wife a valid ground to petition for
dissolution of marriage.
55. ILR
1982(1) Kar. 491 – B.S. Manual Raju vs. Mary Sara – Indian Divorce Act, 1869 –
Section 22 – Judicial separation – Section 22 of the Act speaks of
judicial separation and there is no provision whatsoever in the Act for getting
an order passed for judicial separation confirmed by the High Court. The order
passed for judicial separation is itself operative, without more.
56. ILR 1982(1)
Kar. 743 – Chandramohan Kumar vs. Mrs. Florence Indravathi – Divorce Act, 1869
– Section 3(4) – Karnataka Civil Courts Act – Section 23 – Section
23 of the Karnataka Civil Court Act, 1964, prevails over the provisions of the
Indian Divorce Act, 1869, in respect of the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain,
try and dispose of matters regarding dissolution of marriage.
Divorce Act – Section 11
– Sec.11 of the Divorce Act requires that the husband shall add the adulterer
as a co-respondent in the proceeding. The provision is mandatory. A petition without
the co-respondent cannot be maintained unless leave to dispense with his
presence has been actually obtained from the Court.
57. ILR 1981(2)
Kar. 989 – V. Srinivasan vs. Sub-Registrar, Hiriyur – Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957
– Schedule – Article 30(c) – ‘Money advanced in addition to Rent
reserved’ connotes sum paid in advance as consideration for grant of lease
i.e., money advanced in addition to rent reserved and is premium coming with
Article 30(c).
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 –
Section 105 – Premium is price paid or promised in consideration of
demise i.e., interest of lessor parted with for a price, but periodical
payments made for enjoyment of benefits of lease is rent – Advanced rent paid
being money advanced in addition to rent reserved is premium.
58. ILR 1981(2)
Kar. 1003 – Chief Controlling Revenue Authority – M.V. Chandrasekhar –
Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Schedule: Article 47 – security Bond is
instrument executed by executant for due performance of obligation under
instrument – Surety deposit for due performance of obligations of lease and as
indemnity, liable for refund, is not ‘fine’ or ‘premium’ and is not Bond in
generic sense – The instrument is chargeable as security bond.
59. ILR 1981(2)
Kar. 1101 – J.V. Nazaresh vs. Mrs. Philomina Nazareth – Divorce Act, 1869 –
Section 51 – Proviso is only an exception – Courts shall record
evidence under Rule 5 of Order XVIII of CPC and not render judgments merely on
basis of proof of affidavits – Courts should be satisfied ‘on the evidence’
that case of petitioner is proved.
60. ILR 1981(2)
Kar. 1109 – Susanna vs. Yeshwanth – Divorce Act, 1869 – Section 45 –
Compromise under Order XXIII CPC not applicable to proceedings under the Act –
A decree for divorce on consent of parties not permissible under the Act – Duty
of Court – Sec.45 begins with a Clause ‘subject to the provisions herein
contained’ and the provisions contained in the Divorce Act make it clear that
eh Court shall be satisfied on the evidence about the contentions raised before
it and it shall take precautions with regard to colluding, conniving at and
delaying etc., by the parties.
A matrimonial proceeding is something
more than a mere adversary proceeding between the parties. The Court has a
special responsibility to uphold public morality and to discourage vice and
immorality. It has to scrutinize the evidence to find out whether there is
collusion, there is connivance, there is undue delay and the like. The Court
should bear in mind the solemnity and the sacred nature of the marriage tie.
61. ILR 1984(2)
Kar. 1127 – T.M. Sriramulu Naidu vs. Divisional Commissioner, Bangalore
Division – Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971 – Rules 105, 99, 98(2),
96(5), 107, 27(1)(h) to (k) – In case of regrant of licence to
touring cinema if grant was for less than an year and regrant is sought upto
one year from date of original licence, no re-examination as to whether site
satisfies requirements of Rules – For regrant for a period beyond one year such
examination necessary – Regrant for second and third year only on production of
fresh no objection certificate in respect of site.
62. ILR 1984(2)
Kar. 1193 – State of Karnataka
63. ILR 1984(2)
Kar. 1369 – Controller of Estate Duty vs. Smt. Andal Thayaramma
64. ILR
1984(2) Kar. 1387 – Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 64(1)(i) and (ii)
– Kartha of HUF as partner retains
his representative capacity – Share income accrued assessable only in HUF assessment not in individual status – Sec.64(1)
does nor apply to Kartha of HUF as
partner – Share income of wife and minor child not to be clubbed with personal
income of Kartha-Partner – “Such individual is a partner” excludes individual
who is Kartha of HUF or any one in
representative capacity – Signifies only a person assessed in his individual
capacity.
65. ILR 1986(2)
Kar. 75 – Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. – Income
Tax Act, 1961 – Section 264 – The Commissioner has no jurisdiction
to entertain the Revision Petition of the assessee under Sec.264 of the Act
since that order sought to be revised was already the subject matter of an
appeal to the Tribunal.
66. ILR 1986(2)
Kar. 848 – Special Land Acquisition Officer vs. Soma Gopal Gowda – Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 23(1A) – Additional amount to be
awarded in respect of land acquired before/after coming to force of Amending
Act in all pending cases reference/appeal – Retrospectivity to category of
cases specified in Sec.30(1) does not limit operation but apart from general
application is expressly made applicable to proceeding before Deputy
Commissioner between cut-off dates – Impliedly provides for re-determination at
the hands of Deputy Commissioner even where reference is not sought.
67. ILR 1987 (3)
Kar. 2640 – B.V. Krishnamurthy vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes – Karnataka
Civil Services (Service & Kannada Language) Examination) Rules 1974 – Rules
3 and 45 – After 10.1.1974 till 1.5.1977 – Civil Servant eligible
for promotion without passing service examination prescribed – After 1.5.1977
passing of examination condition of eligibility for promotion.
68. ILR 1987(3)
Kar. 2739 – State of Karnataka vs. Mohammed Kunhi – Limitation Act, 1963 –
Articles 22 & 55 – Essential pre-requisite is existence of
agreement to pay on demand – Express agreement to pay on happening of specific
event excludes scope for implication as to when payable – Demand for payment of
deposit does not necessarily imply existence of agreement to pay only on demand
– Breach of promise giving rise to cause of action to sue for compensation
i.e., return of deposit comes within Article 55.
69. ILR 1987(3)
Kar. 2919 – Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Manager-Advances, State
Bank of Mysore – Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Article 34 – Equitable
mortgage by deposit of title deeds created by mere deposit of title deeds or
evidence of title; need not be in writing – Attracts stamp duty and compulsory
registration of reduced to writing.
Section 2(1)(a) – Bond – Connotation – Definition not exhaustive –
Instrument to be considered as a whole – Undertaking to pay money by executor
of instrument necessary – Not matter for interference.
Trusts Act, 1882 – Section 3
– Trust – Ingredients: Person to carry out objects of trust; property vested in
Trustee; and person entitled to enforce provisions of trust.
70. ILR 1987(4)
Kar. 3315 – B. Sathyanarayana Singh vs. Karnataka State Transport Appellate
Tribunal – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section 47(3) – Before
determining application for grant of new stage carriage permit, on
intra0regional route, determination as to number of stage carriages for which
permits to be granted to be determined. Without such determination and
substantial compliance with Section, grant of permit devoid of jurisdiction.
Violation would affect public interest. Public interest not to be confused with
convenience of travelling public being only one aspect. Permit granted in
violation, nullity, invalid and void cannot be validated. Interference
therewith not hypertechnical but is in larger public interest keeping authority
in bounds and ensures action in conformity with mandatory statutory provisions.
71. ILR 1987(4)
Kar. 3762 – S.N. Hada vs. The Binny Limited Staff Association – Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 34 -
The Government can authorize a private person also to file a complaint
and such a complaint shall be regarded as a valid complaint under Sec.34 of the
Industrial Disputes Act on which Court can take cognizance of any offence
punishable under the Act.
72. ILR 1988(3)
Kar. 2624 – State of Karnataka vs. Ahmed & Jolly – Prevention of Food
Adulteration Act, 1954 – Section 13 & Prevention of Food Adulteration
Rules, 1965 – Rule 7 – Report of Public Analyst admissible as
evidence of all facts therein stated and not merely facts relating to result of
analysis – Report being in printed form does not by itself show Public Analyst
had not observed seal at all and had not applied his mind to that aspect.
73. ILR
1989(1) Kar. 457 – General Secretary, Linguistic Minorities Protection
Committee vs. State of Karnataka
74. ILR 1989(3)
Kar. 2112 – A.H. Thimmappa vs. T.H. Ramiah – Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 –
Sections 4(f) & 5 – Scope, ambit, amplitude & intendment –
The Sub-Divisional Magistrate or Taluka Executive Magistrate, as the case may
be, under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 has no competence to go beyond or
behind the tenor of the deed evidencing the transaction of sale and declare the
transaction as one of mortgage.
75. ILR 1989(3)
Kar. 2425 – S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India – Constitution of India – Article
356(1) – Justiciability & Courts’ interference – Principles and
parameters – Satisfaction is of President i.e., Council of Ministers not of
Governor – Governor’s Report to contain relevant facts, inferences drawn and
conclusions reached & President’s satisfaction based thereon cannot be held
unconstitutional. Devoid of relevant material facts, if opinion alone
disclosed, satisfaction by President de hors material facts renders
proclamation unconstitutional. Choice to accept facts in Governor’s Report or
seek further Report or assess without further enquiry of any sort rests solely
with President. Basic fact is relevancy of grounds disclosed and if found
relevant no exception to exercise of power under Article 356(1). Legal mala
fides vitiating proclamation attributable to President or Council of Ministers;
Report by Governor not ground to attribute legal mala fides – Governor’s
personal bona fides not in question, relevant material facts comprehending in
itself idea of all other necessary factors is his satisfaction – Introduction
of Tenth Schedule does not affect exercise of power under Art.356 –Judicial
scrutiny to be so guided that Courts should base decision on disclosed material
and probing at any greater depth to be refrained from.
76. ILR 1990
(1) Kar. 41 – National Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. Mallikarjun – Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 – Sections 95 & 96 – Section 96(1) based on
subsistence of policy – Insured parting with vehicle, policy lapses – Insurance
Company not liable for liability out of accident met with after transfer of
vehicle; entitled to avoid third party risks – Present Law: under Section 157,
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 even without an assignment law provides transfer of
policy from 1st July 1989.
77. ILR 1990(1)
Kar. 16 – United India Insurance Co. vs. Immam Aminsab Nadaf – Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 – As amended by Act of 1982 – Section 92A – Conspectus of Sections
92A, 92B, 92D, 92E, 93, 95, 96(2), 110B – Liability of insurer under
Secs.92A or 110A only to extent undertaken or covered by policy – Tribunal to
decide whether vehicle and whether prima facie the risk covered by policy – No
liability on Insurance Company if patently risk not covered by policy – No
award under Sec.92A without summary enquiry and finding prima facie risk
covered by policy.
78. ILR 1990(2)
Kar. 1425 – P.K.M. Aboobacker vs. Union of India – Constitution of India – Article
22(1), (3), (5) – Right to consult and be defended by Advocate –
Right under Article 22(1) taken away under (3) in case of detenu, detained
under preventive detention law – Right of detenu provided under (5) to make
representation against detention – What is taken away under (3) cannot be
inducted into (5) by interpretation – Where complicated questions of facts
& law are involved, being exceptional case, detenu may seek legal
assistance on making our clear case therefore – If denied, prejudice caused to
be established by detenu clearly – Not being part of right of detenu, non-consideration of request to engage
counsel does not vitiate detention – Not mandatory procedural requirement.
79. ILR 1990(3)
Kar. 4300 – Kannamma vs. Deputy General Manager – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 –
Section 110A Read with Sec.306 of Indian Succession Act – Legal
Representatives: right to come on record & continue proceedings initiated
by deceased claimant: Principles – If death not consequential to injuries
sustained in accident cannot be prosecuted by Legal Representatives – If death
due to accident Legal Representatives can prosecute petition only relating to
loss to estate of deceased.
80. ILR 1990(3)
Kar. 4324 – O.V. Shanthakumari vs. Kokila – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section
110B – ‘Operative Multiplier evolved in ILR 1985 Kar 2337 law
declared by High Court and precedent to be followed by Tribunals – Conclusions
of Supreme Court in 1987(1) ACJ 172 & AIR 1989 SC 1074 reached in the
setting of the facts of the particular cases; not ‘law declared’ under Article
141 of Constitution of India: cannot be regarded as having impliedly over-ruled
law declared in ILR 1985 Kar. 2337 – Contrary view in ILR 1990 Kar. 3240
assuming such conclusions as principles laid down by Supreme Court over-ruled.
81. ILR 1990(4)
Kar. 2475 – C. Mohamed Zafrulla Sheriff vs. Regional Transport Authority –
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 217(2)(3) – Draft scheme under
Sec.68C Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 refers to draft scheme as proposed by any of
the undertakings in Sec.68(A) (i) to (iv) – ‘Disposed of’ means determination
not procedural aspects – Limitation of one year in Sec.100(4) applicable to
scheme under Sec.68C – 1988 Act come into force on 1.7.1989, if not finalized
till 1.7.1990, proposal deemed lapsed, 1.7.1989 being starting point of
limitation.
82. ILR 1990(4)
Kar. 2826 – N. Rajsekhar vs. V.N. Roy – Karnataka Rent Control act, 1961 –
Section 3(h) Read with Sec.21(4) : Explanation – Mortgagee in
possession; landlord entitled to all rights of mortgagor & to be in
possession until mortgage redeemed – Statutory tenant, under original landlord,
a statutory tenant under mortgagee also.
83. ILR 1990(4)
Kar. 3069 – Shivalingappa Murigeppa Kadi vs. Shivayogappa – Bombay Public Trust
Act, 1950 – Sections 70A & 72(1)(2) – Application to District
Judge under Sec.72 lies against decision of Charity Commissioner under Section
70A even if coupled with order of remand which entails setting aside decision –
Even order under Sections 40, 41, 70 or 70A subject matter of application under
Sec.72(1) – Interpretation not to whittle down scope of Sec.72(1) – While
Sections 79 & 80 oust jurisdiction of Civil Court power under Sec.72
specific power saved & conferred on Civil Court – When order annulled &
matter remitted such order decision on merits open to challenge before Court
under Sec.72(1).
84. ILR 1991(4)
Kar. 3679 – SAIL vs. SAIL Contract workers’ Union – Contract Labour (Regulation
& Abolition) Act, 1970 – Sections 7,9 and 12 – The failure of
the contractor to obtain a licence under Sec.12 of the Act would not result in
bringing about the direct relationship of employer and employee between the
contract labour and the principal employer.
85. ILR 1991
Kar. 1041 – Chief Controlling Revenue Authority vs. Dr. H. Narasimhaiah –
Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 – Articles 52(d), 54A & 48 read with
Sec.2(1)(q)(iii) : Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 – Section 14
– The deeds in question are not Declaration of Trust chargeable to Stamp Duty
under Art. 54A of the Schedule to the Act. The instruments are liable to Stamp
Duty under Art5icle 48 of the Schedule to the Act read with Sec.2(1)(q)(iii) of
the Act.
86. ILR 1991
Kar. 1057 – State of Karnataka vs. N.A. Nagendrappa – Karnataka Zilla
Parishads, Taluk Panchayat Samithis, Mandal Panchayats & Nyana Panchayats
Act, 1983 – Section 5(5) – Delimitation of Constituencies – Power
under Sec.5(5) wide to include power to amend Declaration Notification, before
notice of election under Rule 12, by issuing Errata Notification – Delimitation
& allotment of seats ‘an electoral matter’ – Power under Section 5(5)
exercisable according to criteria under sub-sections (2), (4) & 5: wrong
delimitation non-compliance with Sec. 5(5) – Non-compliance ground under
Sec.18(1)(d)(iv) to question election of returned candidate filing Election
Petition under Sec.14(1) where election materially affected – Articles 226
& 227 unavailable after issue of Notification of election, questioning
validity of Delimitation Notification or election of returned candidates.
87. ILR 199
Kar. 1749 – Union of India vs. Alembic Glass Industries – Central Excise &
Salt Act, 1944 – Section 4(4)(d)(ii) – Explanation – As per the
second part of the Explanation to section 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act, the effective
rate of duty has to be deducted not only from the normal price but also from
any amount charged and collected as excise duty, but subsequently refunded, if
the benefit of refund has not been passed on to the buyer.
As per Clause (ii) of the second part
of the Explanation to Sec.4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act, in cases where the higher
rate of duty is initially assessed and collected from the customers by a
manufacturer and paid to the Government and subsequently on a proper
computation the excise duty gets reduced and becomes refundable to the
manufacturer, excise duty on the amount so becoming refundable is leviable, if
the benefit of such refund is not passed on to the buyer.
Where fully duty is levied on exempted
goods, and subsequently as a result of applying the exemption Notification, the
excess duty is refundable such excess amount the benefit of which is not passed
on to the buyers becomes part of the normal price, in view of the Explanation
to Sec. 4(4)(d)(ii) of the Act.
88. ILR 1991
Kar. 2045 – National Insurance Co. vs. Dundamma – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 –
Sections 2(3), (8), (16), (22), (23), (25), (29) & 33, 53, 56, 66 & 67
– Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963, Rule 161 – Under a motor vehicle
insurance policy issued by an Insurance Company in conformity with Sec.95 of
the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Insurance Company is not liable; by the
forces of Clause (ii) of the Proviso to Sec.95(1)(b) of the Act; to pay
compensation in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person travelling
in a vehicle which is not a vehicle
constructed or adapted and meant in law for carrying passengers for hire or
reward such as a goods vehicle even to the extent of number of
passengers/persons permitted to be carried in the vehicle, except in respect of
the owners of the goods travelling in a goods vehicle having engaged the
vehicle under an agreement with the owner for carrying goods for hire or
reward, and the goods carried are those as defined in Sec.2(7) of the Act,
subject to the condition that such liability shall cover only upto the extent
of the number of persons permitted to be carried in the goods vehicle under
Rule 161 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963.
89. ILR 1992(2)
Kar. 979 – Nanjundaswamy vs. Asst. Registrar of Co-operative Societies –
Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 – Section 70 – The remedy
of an Election petition is the remedy that is normally available in election
disputes. The principle of law is that once the election process is begun it
should not be interfered with. The alternative remedy of an Election petition
is clearly available to the write petitioner under Sec. 70 of the Act.
90. ILR
1992(2) Kar. 1117 – M/s. Kareemsons Pvt. Ltd., vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax –
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Sections 139(4) & 147 – Both to be read harmoniously
to arrive at taxable income. The right given to the assessee under Sec.139(4)
by the Act cannot be lost, merely because, the Revenue instituted proceedings
under Sec.147, in the meanwhile. Right to file a return, falling within
Sec.139(4) is as much a statutory right vested in the assessee, as is the power
vested in the Assessing Officer to net the escaped income for taxation under
Sec.147. There is no reason to read the two provisions as in conflict with one
another or to read one provision as overriding the other; both can stand
harmoniously to arrive at the true taxable income.
91. ILR 1992(2)
Kar. 1296 – Sri Ramakrishna Theatres Ltd., vs. General Investments &
Commercial Corporation Ltd., - Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 – Section 21(1)
– The object of the Act is not to confer such a wide and large right on the
landlord, as to enable him to recover possession of the leased premises, at a
time when he possessed no such right under general laws…While the no such right
under general law…While the contractual tenancy subsists, the Rent Control Act
cannot be applied to evict the tenant. The recovery of possession will have to
be made only by recourse to Section 21(1).
92. ILR 1992(2)
Kar. 1359 – Booda Poojary vs. Thomu Poojarthy – Karnataka Land Reforms Act,
1961 – Sections 48A, 112(B)(b), 132 & 133 – Under Sec.48A of the
act the Tribunal after holding enquiry has the jurisdiction to determine as to
who is entitled for grant of occupancy rights among the rival claimants…It is
clear that the Land Tribunal is competent to decide for the purpose of
disposing of the applications under Sec.48A the question whether the lease hold
rights were held exclusively by the applicant or by the joint family…It becomes
necessary for the Tribunal to decide the rival claims and confer occupancy
rights to a person whoever is entitled to including the joint family…Once the
occupancy rights are granted, the lease hold rights stand converted into free
hold rights without damaging the rights of the occupant’s family or any member
thereof. It is always open to the member or members of the family to claim
their share or rights in Civil
Court over the lands on which occupancy rights are
granted by establishing their right or interest in the property.
93. ILR 1992(2)
Kar. 1483 – K. Rangaswamy vs. State of Karnataka – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 –
Section 4(1) – Service of individual notice directory not mandatory
– Publication in Official Gazette & in locality sufficient procedural
safeguard; no prejudice in the absence of service of individual notice.
94. ILR 1992(2)
Kar. 1494 – Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd., vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka
Sales Tax Act, 1957 – Section 8A & II Schedule: Entry 48A(ii) –
A notification under Sec.8A of the Act will be impliedly repealed or rendered
ineffective when the Legislature amends the Act and introduces an Entry in the
Schedule to the act which relates to the class of goods to which exemption is
given by the Notification.
95. ILR
1992(3) Kar. 2180 – Narayani Rao vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes –
Karnataka Sales Tax Rules, 1957 – Rule 6(4)(f) – Freight charges:
Exclusion – If the dealer incurs the expenditure towards freight of his own
goods, normally it would add itself to the cost of his goods and hence will be
an element of the price for the goods when he sells it. Only because the
freight is specified and separately charged, without including such an amount
in the sale price, it cannot be automatically held as a deductible item. Facts
of each case will have to be examined to see the real nature of the alleged
cost of freight, though specified and separately charged, so that cost which
would normally be a component of the cost of the goods to the dealer may note
escape the tax net.
96. ILR 1992(4)
Kar. 3587 – Krishi Mattu Ksheera Utpadaka Vividdhoddesha Sahakari Sangh Niyamit
vs. Sohanlal – Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 – Section 125 –
Notice mandatory where act in question with reference to Society or officer or
both & relates to constitution, management or business of society. The
expression ‘any act’ referred to in Sec.125 is not confined to illegal
omissions alone but also covers a mere omission simpliciter.
97. ILR 1992(4)
Kar. 3709 – Paragounda vs. Bhimappa – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Sections 95,
96 & 31 – Section 31 of the Act provides the procedure as to how
the transfer of ownership of a motor vehicle is to be reported by the
transferor and the transferee…The proper view appears to be that unless it is
proved that the “registered owner” has ceased to be the owner of the vehicle,
he continues to be liable in the event of an accident for the claims of the
third parties. In other words, the onus to establish cessation of his title in
the vehicle by virtue of a bonafide transfer thereof lies upon the registered
owner and unless and until that burden is discharged, he would continue to be
liable to meet the liability arising out of an accident involving the vehicle.
98. ILR 1993(1)
Kar. 1 – Special Land Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – As
amended by Act No. 68 of 1984 - Section 25 – The restriction found
in the earlier Section has been taken away. This amendment made to Section 25
seems to be deliberate to advance justice and enable the claimants to obtain
fair compensation.
99. ILR 1993(1)
Kar. 293 – Karnataka Steel & Wife Products Ltd., vs. Kohinoor Rolling
Shutters & Engineering Works (P) Ltd., - Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 446
& 458A – Section 458A providing exclusion of certain time
available only if claim subsisting on date of winding up proceeding commenced –
Under Sec.446(2) claim application or any other proceeding subsisting on date
of commencement of winding up proceeding, time barred claim not covered,
jurisdiction of winding up Court from date of winding up order covering
proceedings commenced earlier, being transferable – No period of limitation
prescribed under Sec.446(2) and no right or obligation or new cause of action
giving rise to fresh starting point of limitation created on passing of winding
up order or appointment of official/Provisional Liquidator – Claim not barred
by time enforceable within period of time under Law of Limitation excluding two
periods under Sec.458A – Article 137, Limitation Act, 1963 applicable only fi
no other Article applicable – Nature of claim before winding up Court &
relevant provisions of Limitation Act relevant for determining period of
limitation for particular claim.
100. ILR 1993(1)
Kar. 1283 – Khaja Education Society vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka High
Court Act – Section 7 – Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959 – Rules 6 & 7
– Section 7 does not either prohibit or take away the jurisdiction of a Bench
consisting of not less than two Judges of the High Court to refer the entire
case to a Full Bench of the High Court…A full Bench shall consist of minimum of
three Judges of the High Court. It may even consist of even more than three
judges of the situation demands. Rule 6 of the High Court Rules read with the
definition of the expressions “Bench” and “Full Bench” as defined, there is a
power vested in the Chief Justice of the High Court to constitute Benches
consisting of, a single Judge, two judges, or three or more Judges…It is the
prerogative of the Chief Justice to constitute Benches consisting of single,
two, three or more than three Judges as
the situation demands and to assign work…It is not possible to hold that the
Orders referring these petitions to a Full bench suffer from any infirmity so
as to render Constitution of this Special Bench as invalid.
101. ILR 1993(3)
Kar. 2673 – Machettira Machaiah vs. Machettira Kariappa – Coorg Land Revenue
Regulations, 1899 Repealed by Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 – Regulation 127
– It is obvious that the entire Regulation has been repealed… it must be held
that after the repeal of the Coorg Regulations by the Karnataka Act of 1964,
the procedural provisions like Regulation 127, do not survive any further and
cannot be resorted to by any of the parties. The prohibition regarding
jurisdiction of the Civil Court
to entertain such dispute would also not survive.
102. ILR 1993
(3) Kar. 3035 – Harikumar vs. State of Karnataka – Dowry Prohibition Ct, 1961 –
Section 8A – Burden of Proof : Rule of Evidence casting burden in
certain cases on accused – The prime burden of proof rests on the prosecution
to establish the basic facts and ingredients for bringing home to the accused
the offence under Sec.3 or Sec.4 of the Act and the prosecution will have to
establish its case in this connection beyond reasonable doubt. Once that
happens, then only the burden will shift on the accused under Sec.8A of the
act…The said burden on the accused as contemplated in Sec.8A of the Act can be
discharged on preponderance of probabilities…The burden of proof on the accused
is of a similar nature as is the burden in a civil action i.e., to establish
the case by preponderance of probabilities and not by proof beyond reasonable
doubt…Section 8A of the act as read down is constitutionally and legally valid.
103. ILR 1993(3)
Kar. 2367 – Guddalli vs. Registrar of Co-operative Societies – Karnataka
Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 – Sec.28A(4) – ‘Year’ : Calendar
year distinct from ‘Co-operative year’ – Term of office bearers linked with
calendar year, though term of Managing Committee three Co-operative years –
Term of last elected Body of Office bearers does not extend beyond term of
Managing Committee : office bearers to vacate office even though 12 calendar
months not completed.
104. ILR 1993(3)
Kar. 2605 – State of Karnataka vs. Dundamada Shetty – Mines & Minerals (Regulation
& Development) Act, 1957 – Section 4 – Sec.4(1) will cover cases
where the patta holder seeks to create a lease of minor mineral like granite,
which may be belonging to him and which may be situated in his land. If such an
occupant, wants to give a lease of such minor mineral for the purpose of
exploitation to any third party, lessee, he has to follow the provision of
Sec.4(1) of the Mines and Minerals Act. When a provision under the relevant
Rules tries to regulate a lease for quarrying a mineral, it would not cover the
cases where the owner of the mineral himself wants to exploit the mineral
without creating any lese in favour of third party.
Karnataka Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 1969 – Chapter V – Ryotwari – Pattadar in Ex-Madras State
105. ILR 1994
Kar. 1 – Thomas vs. Lucy – Divorce Act, 1869 – Section 11 –
The non-impleading of the alleged adulterer is a lacuna that affects the very jurisdiction of
the Court to grant decree for dissolution. It is relevant to remember that the
object of Sec.11 is to prevent collusive divorces and Section 11 is not a mere
formality.
Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section
16(1) – Order 19 Rule 1 CPC – In matrimonial matters, particularly
when adultery is alleged, it is advisable to have the benefit of evidence of
the petitioner in person, as the demeanor of the petitioner will be of great
relevance…Unless there are exceptional circumstances warranting dispensation of
parole evidence, which is the general rule, the Court should record the
evidence of the parties. The practice of accepting evidence by way of affidavit
without sufficient cause by the Family Court is not satisfactory and has to be
deprecated.
106. ILR 1994
Kar. 4 – Ruth vs. M. Danial – Divorce Act, 1869 – Sections 15 and 11 –
Compliance with Sec.11 cannot be avoided…The mandatory requirements of Sec.11
of the Act not having been fulfilled, it is not possible to grant any relief to
the husband in a proceeding initiated by the wife, by relying on Sec.15 of the
Act.
107. ILR 1994
Kar. 159 – Syed Bhasheer Ahamed vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Village
Offices Abolition Act, 1961 – As amended by act No.13 of 1978 – Sections 5,6,7
& 7A – Conspectus of provisions – Alienation of regranted
Service Inam Land during 1.2.1963 to 7.8.1978 valid: not disentitled to
regrant: alienee person with imperfect title entitled to continue in possession
& get the benefit of regrant to alienor – Date of re-grant whether before
or 7.8d.1978 not relevant to determine validity of alienation between d1.2.1963
& 7.8.1978 – No re-grant to alienee in his own name – No provision to evict
alienee under alienation made between 1.2.1963 & 7.8.1978, Section 7
inapplicable, such alienee not ‘unauthorised holder’.
108. ILR 1994
Kar. 439 – Girish vs. State of Karnataka
109. ILR 1994
Kar. 726 – Vasudeva
Pai Karnataka
110. ILR 1994
Kar. 1173 – Mrs. Anna Mary Pinto vs. Mr. Urban Anthony Lobo – Indian Divorce
Act, 1869 – Section 16 & 17 – There is no question of Decree (Nisi)
being placed before Full Bench for confirmation under Sec.17 of the Act and it
is only such matters which are passed by the District Judge that could be
placed before High Court for confirmation before the Full Bench as provided
under Sec.17 of the act.
111. ILR 1994
Kar. 1971 – C.M.
Udasi Karnataka
112. ILR 1994
Kar. 2341 – Gururaj @ Gurunath Govind Rao vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka
Land Reforms Act, 1961 – Sections 118(2b) & 118A – “Final” – A
revision lies under Sec.118A of the Act against an order made by the Assistant
Commissioner in a proceeding arising under Sec.118(2b) of the Act.
113. ILR 1997
Kar. 2376 – Smt.
Parvati Hollur Hallappa
114. ILR 1997
Kar. 2922 – The Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Sri M.D. Patil
– Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 256 – Incentive Commission received
by the Development Officer employed with LIC was taxed without 40% deduction as
expenditure incurred by the Assessee for earning that income. In appeal by the
Assessee, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held Assessee was entitled to
the deduction claimed and it was confirmed by the Tribunal in an Appeal by the
Income-Tax Officer. But in reference the High Court held that the Assessee is
not entitled to the deductions claimed – Admittedly, agents are not the
employees/staff of the Corporation and their income by way of commission,
derived out of premiums paid by the insured, are taxable under the head profits
and gains of business or profession. Therefore, the Tribunal has wholly
misdirected itself in extending the benefit of deduction to the present
assessee by relying on the said circular of the board.
115. ILR 1997
Kar. 3122 – Krishna Subbarao Naik vs. Palani Swamy – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 –
Section 173 – Accident occurred on 19.6.87 at 9.15 a.m. – Vehicle
owner obtained insurance policy same day at 10.15 a.m. – whether insurance co.
is liable to compensate the vehicle owner – held, that the policy can be deemed
to have commenced only from the time & date when it was actually obtained.
116. ILR 1997 Kar. 3124 – Gnana
Jyothi TCH College vs. The State of Karnataka – Constitution of India –
Articles 226 and 227 and Writ Proceedings Rules, 1997 – Rule 7 and 36
– Whether it is permissible to pay only one set of Court fee, where more than
one Writ Petition or Writ Appeal are filed by several persons separately,
involving common questions of Law and facts – Held – Though a common petition
or Appeal involving common question of law and facts is permissible to be filed
despite the fact that several persons joining therein may have similar but
separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy, but they
will be required to pay Court fee by treating the petitions or Appeals distinct
and separate.
117. ILR 1997
Kar. 3290 – M/S. United India Sharada
Adyanthaya
118. ILR 1997
Kar. 3302 – Karnataka municipalities Act, 1964 – Section 94 sub-clause (viii)
as amended by Sec.5 of the Municipalities Amendment Act, 1984 –
Whether a Municipality, for water supplied by them, competent to levy, on an
individual, water rate in the form of Tax assessed on buildings and also
competent to charge him for such supply of water according to the quantity used
– Held – Municipality is competent to levy tax by adding the water rate as also
the charges for actual supply. Tax may be levied by taking into account both
water rate as also the charges for the supply of water.
119. ILR 1998
Kar. 3230 – Narasimhasetty vs. Padmasetty – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 –
Section 53-A – Transferee under an agreement to sell can resist a
suit for possession by the owner of the property even though there is failure
on his part to bring a suit for specific performance within the period of
limitation because the extinction of the statutory remedy by some reason or the
other, does not lead to the extinction of a right created by a legislature by
incorporating Sec.53-A in the act. (ILR 1988 Kar. 631, ILR 1992 Kar. 429 and
ILR 1994 Kar. 1665 over ruled.)
120. ILR 1998
Kar. 3620 – The Mysore Paper Mills Ltd., vs. The Mysore India
Articles
226 and 227 and 12 & 14 – Since it is found that the
appellant-company is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the
relief sought for by the respondents can be granted under Article 226 without
reference to the provisions of Article 12.
121. ILR 1998
Kar. 3849 – Sri K. Munishamappa vs. The State of Karnataka – Karnataka
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Rules, 1979 – Rule 5(2) – If the Appellant does not appear on
the date fixed for hearing, the appeal can be dismissed for default only and
cannot be decided on merits.
122. ILR 1998
Kar. 4071 – Hanamappa vs. The Special
Land Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Section 18 –
Award was passed on 28.3.1980. Application by the claimant for Reference was
filed before the Land Acquisition Officer on 25.6.1980. The Land Acquisition Officer
made Reference on 18.10.1984 to the Civil Court, that is 4 years, 3 months and
21 days after the Application for Reference was filed – The question before the
Full Bench was “(1) Whether the Reference made by the Deputy Commissioner to
the Civil Court beyond three years and Ninty Days from the date of the
application for reference, is barred? (2) Whether the decision rendered by the
Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in the case of Special Land Acquisition
Officer vs. Gurappa
Channabasappa Paramaj Gurappa
Channabasappa Paramaj 11th March 1988
lay down correct law.
123. ILR 1998
Kar. 2182 – Kumbara Thimmappa vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Irrigation
Act, 1965 – Sections 15(1) & 15(2) and 16 – The interpretation
given to Sec.15(1) and 15(2) of the act by the Division Bench in Kalappa’s case
and Amareshappa’s case is not based on the principles of law and the object of
the Act.
124. ILR 1998
Kar. 2342 – Baragur Ramachandrappa vs. State of Karnataka – Criminal Procedure
Code, 1973 – Sections 95, 96 and 97 and Penal Code 1860 – Sections 124-A,
153-A, 153-B, 292, 293, 295 and 295-A – Constitution of India – Articles
19(1)(a) and 19(2) – Powers of the Government to declare
publications promoting enmity between classes or containing imputations or
obscene matter written with intent to insult the religion of any class of
persons, forfeited. Held – Government has such power to declare and the
impugned Notification issued is quite proper and just.
125. ILR 1998
Kar. 2366 – St. Joseph’s High Primary School vs. Smt. J. Rose Mary – Karnataka
Private Educational Institutions (Discipline and Control) Act, 1975 – Section
10 – Whether the Education Appellate Tribunal constituted under the
Act can entertain Appeals under Sec.10 also as against an order of “Termiantion
Simpliciter?” Held – Appeal by an Employee before the Tribunal even as against
an order of termination simpliciter is maintainable. The decisions in 1979(1)
KLJ 98 and 1982(1) KLJ 484 lay down the correct law. But the decision in
1981(1) KJLJ 559 overruled as not properly laid down.
126. ILR 1999
Kar. 261 – Smt. Hambamma vs. The State of Karnataka – Karnataka Land Revenue
Rules, 1960 – Rule 43-J and Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prohibition of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 – Sections 4 & 5 – Once
the conditions stipulated in Rule 43(G) cannot be applied to the grants under
Rule 43(J) as there is no power or authority to impose any condition stating
that the land granted under Rule 43(J) cannot be alienated for a period of 15
years or any other period. It is a settled principle of law that the delegatee
cannot exceed his power and he has only to act within the power conferred on
him. Therefore, the condition imposed by the Tahasildar in the saguvali Chit,
at the time of issuing the same, that the grantee shall not alienate the land
for a period of fifteen years, when such condition was not imposed by the order
of the Authority making the grant, cannot be sustained.
The granting authority, as well as the
Tahasildar, derive their power from Rule 43(J). When there is no power to
impose any condition in the Saguvali Chit under Rule 43(J), at the time of
grant, the subordinate authority, i.e., the Tahasildar has exceeded his limit
in imposing the condition.
127. ILR 1999
Kar. 634 – B. Mohammad vs. Deputy Commissioner – Karnataka Land Revenue Act,
1964 – Karnataka Land Grant Rules 1969 – Rule 29-A & 40 and Karnataka
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain
Lands) Act, 1978 – Rule 29A is not deemed to have been obliterated
from backdate (retrospectively) in view of Sec.4 and 11 of Karnataka Act 2 of
1979. In view of the Rule 29A of the rule referred to supra, clause 12 of the
condition referred to above continued to exist as modified. On and after
17.10.1974 i.e., the date with effect from which date Rule 29A was introduced
and till 1.1.1979 the date of coming into force of Act 2 of 1979 referred to
above, all transactions were subject to the said Rule 29A (Decision reported in
Laxmamma vs. State of Karnataka – 1983(1) KLJ 417 over ruled).
128. ILR 1999
Kar. 2725 – Noorulla vs. P.K. Prabhakar & another – Motor Vehicles Act,
1939 – Sections 95, 96 & 110AA and Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 –
Section 4 – Under Sec.95(1) of the act, it is now mandatory for the
owner of a goods vehicle to get insured against the risk of death or bodily
injury of his employees arising out of and in the course of their employment
because of the use of the vehicle in a public place, in respect of the
liability arising under the compensation Act.
129. ILR 2001
Kar. 504 – Commissioner of Wealth Tax vs. D.M. Srinivas
130. ILR 200
Kar. 520 – M/s. Khimijibhai Mills and Another vs. The Additional Commissioner
of Commercial Taxes, Belgaum Zone – Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 – Sections
12-A, 21, 22, 22-A and Constitution of India – Articles 226 and 227
– Section 22-A does not put a limitation on the revisional authority to pass
the final order within a specified period. Contention that power of the Addl.
Commissioner/ Commissioner to call for the records, to examine them and to pass
such order as he thinks fit are three independent powers and all those powers
should be exercised within the time fixed under Sec.22-A(3) of the act cannot
be accepted it becomes unworkable.
131. ILR 2001
Kar. 766 – Bangalore Grain Merchants Association vs. The District Registrar for
Societies – Karnataka Societies Registration act, 1960 – Section 25(1) –
Constitution of India – Articles 226 and 227 – Full Bench did not
accept the contention of the petitioner that the powers of the Registrar are
circumscribed by two pre-conditions envisaged in Sec.25(1), that complaint
should have been made by majority group of members of a Governing Body or by
not less than 1/3 of the members of the Society and the suo-motu power cannot
be exercised once a complaint is made by less than the number of members mentioned
therein and the concept of suo motu power, excludes an action based on
representation or complaint.
132. ILR 2001
Kar. 1111 – Messrs. Krishna Trading Company vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka
Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) act, 1966 – Orders issued there
under and Constitution of India – Articles 226 and 227 – The
decision taken in Rajashekharaiah’s case does not require reconsideration –
There is no justification in levying and collecting market fee under Sec.65(2)
even though the market fee was collected by the same Market Committee on the
first transaction.
133. ILR 2001
Kar. 2030 – State of Karnataka vs. B. Krishna Bhat – Karnataka High Court Act,
1961 – Sections 4,6,7 and 10 – Karnataka High Court Rules, 1959 – Rules 6 and 7
– The Chief Justice has the discretion to refer matters which can be tried by a
single Judge to a Bench of two Judges though he does not have the power to do
vice-versa. Therefore, the Notification dated 8.7.1997 allocating all PIL to
Division Bench is in valid exercise of the power of the Chief Justice.
Constitution of India – Articles
226 & 227 – Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 – Section 9(xii) –
Once further proceedings are stayed by the Appellate Bench, the Single Judge
ceases to have jurisdiction to deal with the matter or pass any Judicial order
therein. Any, order, whether interim or final passed in such proceedings which
has been stayed, is without jurisdiction.
134. ILR 2002
Kar. 4693 – Mohammed Jaffar vs. State of Karnataka – Constitution of India –
Articles 226 and 227 – Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 – Sections 44, 45, 55,
77, 77-A – Karnataka SC and ST (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act,
1978 – Section 3(1)(b) – Provisions of Secs. 45 and 48 of the
Karnataka Land Reforms Act have not been considered by the Learned Single Judge
in Narayana Prameshwar Naik Lalitha Nagappa
Naik
135. ILR 2002
Kar. 1831 – Rosy Kurian
Kannanaikal
Provisions of Sec.7(1)(a) and (b) of
the Family Court act read with Sections 10 and 17 of the Divorce Act make it
mandatory that decree passed by a Family Court under Sec.10 of the Divorce Act
has, necessarily to be confirmed by the High Court under Sec.17 of the Divorce
Act and till then decree passed by the Family Court does not become final and
therefore does not become Appealable under Sec.19 of the Family Courts Act as
it lays down that no appeal would lie from an interlocutory order.
This was the position before the
amendment to the Divorce Act, 1869, by the Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 which
received the assent of the President of India on September 24, 2001 and which came into force
from 3.10.2001. Sec. 17 of the Divorce Act which deals with confirmation by
High Court in regard to decrees granted by District Judge has been completely
omitted and in its place new Sec.17 has been substituted.
Now, a District Court or Family Court
can under Sec. 14 of the F.C. Act pronounce a decree declaring such marriage to
be dissolved and such a decree would be final and executable as it does not
require any confirmation by the High Court. After the amendment, against such
orders or decrees passed by the Family Court under Sec.4 and 19 of Divorce Act,
an appeal would lie under Sec. 19 of the F.C. Act to the High Court which
should be heard by a Bench of two or more Judges. The net effect of this amendment
is that the orders passed by the District Judge/Family Court under Sec.14 and
19 of the Divorce Act are final they are no longer decree nisi which require
confirmation by the High Court under the old Law.
136. ILR 2002
Kar. 1849 – Patel Byrappa vs. State of Karnataka – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 –
Section 4(1) - Constitution of India –
Articles 226, 227 and 254(2) – Whether the Karnataka Land
Acquisition Act, 1961 stands repealed by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act,
1984? – If the law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the
Concurrent List is inconsistent with the provisions made by the Parliament,
then such piece of Legislation can be protected by obtaining the consent of the
President under Article 254(2).
137. ILR 2002
Kar. 1864 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and Indian Succession Act,
d1925 – Section 306 – Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Section 110A –
Whether the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 supersede the provisions
of Sec. 306 of Indian Succession Act? – In case of death resulting from the
accident, the legal representatives of the deceased can file claim petition. In
view of Sec.306 of the Indian Succession act the cause of action survives to
the legal representative of the deceased, whose death is the result of the
personal injuries sustained in the accident.
There is no inconsistency between Sec.
166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and Section 306 of the Indian Succession
Act.
Claim petition field by the person who
has sustained injuries in a motor accident, cannot be prosecuted by his legal
representatives, on such person’s death occurring not as a result of consequent
of bodily injuries sustained in a motor accident.
Judgment of Full Bench in Kannamma vs.
Deputy General Manager, (ILR 1990 Kar. 4300) lays down correct proposition of
law and as such does not require any reconsideration.
138. ILR 2002
Kar. 2490 – National Insurance Co. Ltd., vs. Smt. Prema – Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 – Section 173 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XLI – Rule 22
– So long as the insured has not challenged the Award and so long the liability
would only fall on the Insurance Company, it is inequitable to deny the remedy
of Appeal to the Insurance Company. In appeal preferred by the Insurance
Company either challenging only the liability to compensate or the quantum o
compensation, the Respondent-claimant is entitled to prefer cross-objections
seeking enhancement of compensation.
139. ILR 2002
Kar. 2501 – V.S. Gowdar vs. The Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., - Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – The only difference between a
claim under Sec.163-A based on no fault and that based on proof of fault under
Sec. 166 and 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is that while in the former, a
victim or his legal heirs are not required to prove the fault of the driver of
the vehicle, in the latter case, proof of one of the exceptions to the Doctrine
of strict liability as enunciated in the English decision, may entitle the
insurance company or the owner to avoid liability. Suffice it to say, that even
on a purely theoretical plane, the difference between claims based on no fault
liability and that based on proof of fault is slowly eroding. We therefore see
no reason why the multiplier prescribed by the Parliament for determination of
compensation in no fault cases should not be applicable even to cases based on
proof of fault. WE also see no reason why the benefit of a beneficial piece of
legislation introduced by the Parliament in the form of Secs. 163-A and 163-B
of the Act read with Schedule should be restricted only to claims that arise
out of accidents after the amendment especially when what is being borrowed
from out of the said legislation is only a norm for determination of just
compensation which is common to both fault and no fault cases.
140. ILR 2002
Kar. 2750 – C.N. Nagendra Singh vs. The Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore
District – Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 – Sections 127 to 129 – Karnataka
Land Revenue Rules 19, Rules 43 and Constitution of India – Articles 226 and
227 – When the Revenue Court is prevented from recording the
statements of the parties and the depositions, the question of establishing the
genuineness of the will would not arise. Hence the Revenue Courts have no
jurisdiction to go into the genuineness of the will or questions of title.
141. ILR 2002
Kar. 2758 – Narasareddy vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga – Karnataka
Land Grant Rules, 1956 – As amended in 1988 Rule 43(6-A) and Karnataka Land
Grant Rules, 1969 – Rule 9 and Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Tribes
(Prevention of Transfer of Certain Lands) act, 1979 – Sections 4 & 5 and
Constitution of India – Articles 226 and 227 – If any person
purchases land from a person belonging to weaker section of the society, the
period of prohibition will count from the “date of putting the grantee in
possession”.
142. ILR 2003
Kar. 194 – Smt. Severine D’Souza vs. Felix Ambrose D”Souza – Indian Succession
Act, d1925 – Section 213 and Section 227 – The proceedings for
probate or letters of administration are only concerned with due execution of
the ‘Will’. Reference made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Chiranjilal Srilal Goenka Jasjic Singh Maria
Bai Apex Court . The
observations made by the Division Bench that once a probate application is
converted into a Civil Suit, the Court gets jurisdiction to determine the
question of title to the property etc., cannot therefore be said to be stating
the legal position correctly. The Division Bench decision in Maria Bai
143. ILR 2003
Kar. 368 – Boraiah vs. State by Ramanagaram police – Karnataka High Court Act,
1961 – Section 10 – Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 293, 294 –
Evidence Act, 1882 – Sections 3, 32, 58, 145, 157 and 159 – Sec. 294
dispenses with proof of every document when it becomes formal or its
genuineness not being disputed. A post-mortem report or any other document of
which genuineness is not disputed by the accused can be read as substantive
evidence without formal proof…sub-section 3 of Section 294 of Cr.P.C. covers
post mortem reports and every other document of which genuineness is not
disputed…Section 294 does not control or regulate Sec.293…There must be enough
indication in the record to show that the party against whom a document is
sought to be put was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of such document.
If there is no such indication and if the document is simply marked without
being objected to by the other side, then it cannot be read in evidence as it
does not fulfill the requirements of Sec. 294 of Cr.P.C.
144. ILR 2003
Kar. 524 – Virabasayya Prabhayya Hallur vs. State of Karnataka – Reference
under Sec.8 of the Karnataka High Court act, 1961 to a larger Bench – Criminal
Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 374(2), 378(1), 389(3) – Read with Sec. 482
Cr.P.C. – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 147, 148, 302, 304(1) and 324 and
504 read with Section 149 IPC - Constitution of India – Articles
132(1), 132(3), 134(1)(a)(b) and 136 – Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
– Section
4 – Unless a person (accused) has a right of appeal in law under the
Code of Criminal Procedure or the Constitution of India, he is not entitled for
suspension of sentence or bail.
Where
the Court has no power to suspend sentence and grant bail under Sec. 389(3) of
the Code, it has no inherent power to grant bail in exercise of its power under
Sec. 482 of the Code.
145. ILR 2003
Kar. 1385 – Ramaiah vs. State of Karnataka – Mysore (Religious and Charitable
Inams) Abolition Act – Sections 6, 6A, 9 and 27 – The orders passed
by the De-Facto Judge and De-Facto Court are valid orders and can be saved on
the doctrine of de-facto Court which was a legitimate extention of or corollary
to the doctrine of de-facto judge. The compulsion which gave birth to the well
recognized doctrine of de-facto judge were common to situations where the defect
related not to the appointment of the Judge so much as it did to the creation
of the Court to which the de-facto judge was appointed.
The Orders and Judgments of the Land
Tribunal passed by virtue of the Karnataka Act, 26 of 1979, are valid Orders and
any challenge to the Judgments/ Orders can be only on merits in appeal and
Revision proceedings. Such orders passed by the Tribunal are not invalid since
enactments i.e., Act 29 of 79 was held unconstitutional and still born in Sri
Kudli Shringeri Maha Samsthana vs. State (ILR 1992 Kar. 1877).
146. ILR 2003
Kar. 2282 – Abdul Rehman vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Improvement Boards
Act, 1976 – Section 35 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – Amended by Karnataka act
No. 17 of 1961 – Section 6 and 11-A of the Act – Bangalore
Development Authority Act, 1976 – A scheme formulated, sanctioned
and set for implementation under the BDA Act, cannot be stultified or rendered
ineffective and unenforceable by a provision in the Central Act, particularly
of the nature of Sections 6 and 11A, which cannot also on its own force have
any application to actions taken under the BDA Act.
The provisions of the City Improvement
Boards Act are identical to the provisions of the Bangalore Development
Authority Act.
The provisions of the Land Acquisition
Amendment Act, 1984 amending Section 6 and 11-A would not ipso facto apply to
the provisions of BDA Act and Urban Development Authority Act.
147. ILR 2003
Kar. 2531 – Karnataka Sugar Workers Federation ® vs. State of Karnataka –
Karnataka Co-Operative Societies Act, 1959 – Amendments to Sections 70(1)(d)
and 70(2)(d) made – Constitutionality and legality of these
amendments challenged on the ground that the amendments introduced ousts the
jurisdiction of Labour Courts by conferring the jurisdiction on the Registrar
of Co-Operative Societies – A Co-operative Society is constituted and
registered under the statute and such registered body has to follow the
mandatory provisions of Rules and Regulations. The employees of the Co-operative
Society may also be governed by the contract of personal service, but whenever
dispute touching the Constitution, management or business of a Co-operative
Society arises between a society and another Co-operative Society and so also
the disputes arising regarding the terms of employment, working conditions and
disciplinary action taken by the Co-operative Society, such disputes may be
adjudicated by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. As the Amendment Act
incorporates the provisions ousting the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court only
in respect of matters which can be decided by the Registrar or the nominee in
respect of a dispute under Sec. 70 of the KCS Act.
Provisions of Sec. 70 of the KCS (Amendment) Act, 1997 are valid and constitutional
and there can be no reconsideration of the Veerashaiva Co-Operative Bank
Limited case.
Constitution of India
148. ILR 2003
Kar. 3026 – K. Sham Bhat vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Land Revenue Act,
1964 – Sections 79(2), 195 – Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his
delegated power under Sec. 79(2) of the KLR Act, 1961 withdraws the privileges
in respect of ‘Kumki’ rights exercised by any persons and it was held that
order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is an order traceable to statutory
power under Sec.79(2) of the Act and hence abolition of privileges by law need
not be by new legislation and may be by statutory order having force of law.
Delegated power – Order passed in
pursuance of – Such order is it a statutory order having force of law or only
an executive order? – Held – It is not an executive order by a statutory order
having force of law.
149. ILR 2003
Kar. 3562 – Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation vs. Smt. R. Maheshwari –
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Stage Carriage permit – Section 80(3) –
It is not permissible to grant variation of the conditions of stage carriage
permit held by a saved operator under the Kolar pocket Scheme or Bellary pocket
Scheme by increasing the number of trips or number of vehicles unless the
reciprocal agreement between the states so permits as held by the Supreme Court
in R. Venkatesham Chetty’s case.
Law of Precedents –
Where there are two judgments renders by the Benches consisting of equal number
of Judges as in this case, the later in time would prevail.
150. ILR 2003
Kar. 3789 – D.C. Ramesh and others vs. State of Karnataka – Karnataka Land
Revenue Act, 1964 – Sections 71, 72 – Karnataka Land Revenue Rules, Rule 97
– It is well settled that a circular or notification cannot be inconsistent
with the main Act or Rules but at the same time it can supplement. Once the
power has been given to the Deputy Commissioner to pass the order, no circular
issued will amount to an order issued in pursuance to the provisions of the
act. In these circumstances, the circular cannot be said to be inconsistent
with the main Act as this circular will be equivalent to a Government Order as
contemplated under Karnataka Land Revenue act. There is no divergent view in
the two Division bench decisions of this Court in K.V. Vishwanth M. Katappa
151. ILR 2003
Kar. 4858 – N.S. Srinivasamurthy vs. The Registrar of Co-operative Societies in
Karnataka – Payments of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 4 – Mysore Shops and
Establishments Act, 1948 – Section 6 – Karnataka Shops and Establishments Act,
1961 – Sections 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 11, 12 – The finding of the
Division Bench in Malleshwaram Co-operative Society’s case that the provisions
of the 1961 act, are not inconsistent with the provisions under the 1948 Act,
is unsustainable.
Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899
– Section 24 - Mysore Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 – Section 6 –
Karnataka Shops and Establishments Act, 1961 – Sections 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 11,
12 – Inconsistency between two enactments – It is clear from the
provisions of Sec. 24 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act that a notification
issued under the repealed 1948 Act would continue to be operative only if the
provisions of the reenacted Act, 1961 are not inconsistent with the provisions
of the repealed 1948 Act. The provisions enabling the State Government to
exempt applicability of the Act to any establishment, by notification under
Sec. 6 of the repealed Act is not contained in the reenacted 1961 Act. Apart
from sub-section (4) of Sec. 3 of the 1961 Act, the Government is not empowered
under any other provision in the 1961 Act, to exercise the power of exemption
which had been contained in the 1948 Act. Hence, it is clear that the
provisions of the 1961 Act, are inconsistent with the provisions of the 1948
act and hence, the notification issued under the 1948 Act would not continue
even in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 24 of the Karnataka General
Clauses Act.
